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The Role and Politics of Evidence in Development
In  this  summary  of  their  presentation  at  our  ‘Evidence  and  Power  in  Development  Policy’
conference, David Hulme and Pablo Yanguas of the Effective States and Inclusive Development
Research Centre argue that the role of evidence in policy­making depends on the the nature of the
politics  surrounding  it,  and  suggest  ways  in which we  can  contribute  to more  robust  evidence­
based policy­making and better dissemination and use of knowledge.
The two faces of evidence
Progresa­Oportunidades  is  a  Mexican  programme  of
conditional  cash  transfers  to  the  poor  whose  success
stems from the central role of evidence in both its design
and  operation:  empirical  data  were  produced  at  all
stages  in  order  to  determine  whether  performance
failures were due to faulty theory or implementation, thus
allowing  for  constant  adaptation  in  search  of  greater
effectiveness.
The World  Bank  is  a major  development  agency which
has  invested  heavily  in  generating  evidence  for  better
policy. However,  a 2006 evaluation  found  that  the  large
volume of high­quality research produced at the Bank had not been used to improve policy on a
technical  level,  but  to  proselytize  and  generate  political  support:  research  that  supported  pre­
existing policies was publicized, whereas unfavourable research was ignored.





impact as a  result of a clear chain of political  incentives connecting electorates  through cabinet
ministers  and  senior  agency  management  all  the  way  to  programme  officers  and  technical
specialists.  There  is  a  politics  of  evidence  in  development,  which  can  lead  to  certain  perverse
effects:
A pressure to exaggerate the availability and quality of evidence;
An unrealistic public understanding of the complexity of public policy; and
An illusory form of accountability based on ‘experts’ and ‘data’.
The experimental constraint
There  seems  to  be  a  ‘hierarchy  of  evidence’  in  aid  programming which  prioritises  experimental
methods.  This  hierarchy  is  problematic  on  both  conceptual  and  practical  grounds.  First,  the
experimental  logic  of  discovery,  although  desirable,  might  not  be  feasible  for  many  social
processes due to  the complexity and contingency of causation:  ingrained social phenomena  like
poverty, discrimination, corruption, or bad governance are more akin to complex systems subject
to  stochastic  dynamics  than  to  atomized  observations  easily  assigned  to  treatment  and  control
groups. Second, there is a risk that prioritising experimental methodologies will severely constrain








is  robust.  This  view  entirely  misses  the  fact  that  theory  is  inherent  to  every  methodology:
underlying  concepts  and  assumptions  always  impact  the  selection  of  indicators,  variables  and











Increase the use of evidence in developing countries, for instance clarifying the incentives for politicians,
and not just in aid agencies;
Build stronger disciplinary-to-professional relationships, in particular between politics and the
governance profession and anthropology/sociology and the social development profession; and
Ask for the theoretical underpinnings of any evidence base.
Better dissemination and use of knowledge:
Make the evidence debate a Southern issue rather than a Northern imposition;
Improve the use of evidence in the media, especially in developing countries; and
Reframe evidence as part of democratic processes rather than elite exchanges.
Finally,  the  use  of  evidence  in  development  should  be  guided  at  all  times  by  one  overarching
concern: focus on what is important, not merely on what can be easily measured or tested.
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